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A lengthy tug of war between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals may have ended with Impression Products v. Lexmark. The
Supreme Court held that the sale of a patented thing exhausts the patentee
seller’s rights to enforce restrictions on that thing through patent infringement
suits. Further, the parties cannot bargain around this rule through the seller’s
specification of conditions, no matter how clear. No inquiry need be made into
the patentee’s market power, anticompetitive effects, or other types of harms,
whether enforcement of the condition is socially costly or valuable, or whether
the condition has a positive or negative impact on innovation. None of this is
relevant.
Impression Products reveals an economic deficiency that manifests all too
frequently when patent law is brought to bear on market practices. Economic
concepts that are commonly used in antitrust law, such as market power or
output effects, are virtually unknown in patent law. This fact has inclined courts
to go to wild extremes—such as equating every patent with monopoly, or
concluding that a patent is a mere property right and that anything done within
the scope of the patent is permissible. The result, as in this case, can be
draconian rules that are indifferent to effects on innovation, competition,
economic efficiency, or any other measure that seems relevant to innovation
policy. This Article argues that the Supreme Court would have been wise to
develop a more nuanced exhaustion rule that examined actual effects likely to
result from a particular restraint.
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Introduction: Patents and Patented Things
A lengthy tug of war between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals very likely ended when the Supreme Court held that the sale
of a patented article exhausts the patentee seller’s right to enforce restrictions on
that article through a patent infringement suit.1 Further reversing the Federal
Circuit, the Court found that parties cannot bargain around this rule through the
seller’s specification of conditions stated at the time of sale, no matter how clear.2
That is, once a sale of the patented article has occurred, the rule is not merely
presumptive, but absolute. In this Article, I argue that this categorical approach
to patent exhaustion is a mistake that furthers neither patent and innovation
policy, nor competition policy.
The patent first sale, or “exhaustion,” rule applies not to patents themselves
but rather to the sale of patented “things.” To illustrate, if the patentee grants a
production license to an office stapler manufacturer, authorizing it to employ its
patented technology in its stapler, no “thing” is being sold. As a result, a
limitation on where the patented stapler can be manufactured, in what amount,
what the resale price will be,3 or whether the manufacturer must bundle it prior
to sale with the patentee’s staples is ordinarily enforceable insofar as patent law
is concerned. If the patentee or licensee produces a stapler embodying the
patented technology and then sells it, however, exhaustion becomes relevant for
any restriction to be enforced on that particular stapler subsequent to the sale.
The distinction is not between the presence or absence of a license. The purchaser
of a patented office stapler automatically receives an implied license to practice
embodied patents to the extent of using the stapler.4 That implied license does
not give the purchaser a right to make more copies of the stapler. With respect
to the stapler that the buyer actually purchases, however, the exhaustion rule says
1. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
2. Id.
3. For example, under the “GE” rule a patentee can license a competing firm to
manufacture the patented article and specify the price at which it is to be sold. United States v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
4. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 497 (1964); see
also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 184 (1980) (speaking of the “‘implied’
licenses conferred by operation of law upon purchasers” of its patented product).
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that the patentee may not by patent license impose conditions on the stapler’s
subsequent use or sale and enforce these conditions through a patent
infringement suit.
For example, suppose the patentee sells a stapler at wholesale to Office
Depot and requires Office Depot to charge at least $15.00 to customers. That
condition cannot be enforced by a patent infringement lawsuit; although, it
probably could be enforced by a breach of contract action.5 The contract lawsuit
can ordinarily be brought only against those in privity of contract with the
patentee, however. By contrast, if an infringement action were permitted, it could
be brought against everyone who violates the condition, whether or not they are
in privity or have ever agreed to be bound by the contract’s terms. Other
differences could be important as well. For example, the patent infringement
action can be maintained only in federal court under federal law, while the breach
of contract action is ordinarily governed by state law.6
Further, because the question of patent infringement is federal, it would
override conflicting state policies. For example, suppose that resale price
maintenance (RPM) were unlawful under state antitrust law,7 but that patent law
permitted a post-sale infringement action against someone who violated an RPM
condition. In that case, the RPM condition would be enforceable as a matter of
federal patent law, thus preempting the state prohibition.8 Since virtually
anything that can be expressed in a contract can also be expressed as a condition
on a sale, abolition of the first sale doctrine could effectively federalize the law
of use restrictions on patented things. Of course, the federal antitrust laws would
still operate. For example, Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits anticompetitive
exclusive dealing or tying of goods “whether patented or unpatented.”9
None of this will happen under the Supreme Court’s Impression Products
decision, however. The Court stated what amounts to a per se rule: once a
patented thing is sold, conditions imposed on that particular thing cannot be
enforced via patent infringement suits. No further inquiry is made into the
patentee’s market power, anticompetitive effects, or other types of harms,
whether enforcement of the condition is socially costly or valuable, or has a
positive or negative impact on innovation. None of this is relevant.
5. Since 2007, resale price maintenance in the United States has been governed by a
rule of reason. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). As a result, most
instances of it are very likely lawful. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
1620 (4th ed. 2017).
6. See Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., Patents and the Sherman Act, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 709
(1912) (noting jurisdictional differences).
7. States may have their own antitrust laws which are at variance from federal law. See,
e.g., O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 277 P.3d 1062, 1079 (Kan. 2012) (holding that under
Kansas antitrust law RPM remains unlawful per se and noting that “federal precedents interpreting,
construing, and applying federal statutes have little or no precedential weight when the task is
interpretation and application of a clear and dissimilar Kansas statute”).
8. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Exhaustion and Federalism: A Historical Note, 102
VA. L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2016).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018).
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Part I of this Article explores the economic concerns and effects of the
Supreme Court’s exhaustion rule. Part II turns to the rationales that have been
offered for it, concluding that none of them justifies the draconian rule that the
Supreme Court adopted. Part III looks at some of the implications of the harsh
exhaustion rule. Part IV then makes some proposals for a more nuanced approach
to patent exhaustion. A brief conclusion follows.
I. Policy Concerns and Economic Effects
The Impression Products decision reveals an economic deficiency that
manifests all too frequently when patent law is brought to bear on market
practices. Patent law has never developed tools for evaluating such practices.
Economic concepts such as market power, output effects, or effects on
innovation, which are commonly used in economics and antitrust law, are
virtually unknown in patent law. This fact has inclined the Court to go to wild
extremes—such as equating every patent with monopoly, as it has often done,10
or concluding that a patent is a mere property right and that anything done within
the scope of the patent should therefore be permissible.11 Too often, this
produces extreme rules that are indifferent to effects on innovation, competition,
economic efficiency, or any other measure that seems relevant to innovation
policy. The exhaustion rule in Impression Products is an example.
Patent exhaustion cannot be found in the Patent Act or any other federal
statute. It is entirely judge made. It is particularly important that judge-made
deviations from a statute have an articulated policy. Statutes can be the
consequence of politics or capture, or perhaps they are badly drafted. An
important rationale for judge-made deviations from a statute is to set things right
or else fill statutory gaps. In this case, the Intellectual Property (IP) Clause of the
Constitution authorizes Congress to create a patent act in order to promote
innovation.12 This Article therefore assumes that a judge-made exhaustion rule
must reflect that purpose. An innovation-promoting rationale for the per se patent
exhaustion rule is hard to find, however. To be sure, some post-sale restraints
can be anticompetitive, and practices that restrain trade can also restrain
innovation.13 But the collective set of practices that have been subjected to patent
exhaustion hardly falls naturally into that category.
10. E.g., Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (concluding that market
power could be inferred from the existence of a patent), overruled by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink,
Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (speaking
repeatedly of the patent monopoly).
11. E.g., FTC. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that a restraint should be reasonable if it is within the scope of the patent); see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 515 (2015) (arguing
against expansive use of “scope of the patent” immunity from antitrust law).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting the Congress the power “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts”).




Post-sale restraints are generally “vertical.” They operate as between a
seller and a buyer, and typically not between competing sellers or competing
buyers. After decades of litigation under the antitrust laws, courts have
concluded that vertical restrictions should be treated more benignly than
horizontal agreements involving competitors. Restrictions of the kind subject to
patent exhaustion can be both socially harmful and socially beneficial.
Establishing which of these is true ordinarily requires a detailed inquiry into
market power and effects that antitrust law denominates “the rule of reason.”14
Indeed, the overwhelming trend in antitrust jurisprudence over the last forty
years has been to move away from per se rules for vertical restraints and toward
a rule of reason.15
So why should the patent exhaustion rule be so draconian? One commonly
given explanation is that most antitrust cases involving vertical restraints are
limitations on breach of contract suits, not on patent infringement actions. That
is certainly a distinction, but is it one that bears the weight now given to it?
Permitting some enforcement actions via infringement suits can be socially
valuable when (1) the restriction at issue is economically beneficial, but (2)
breach of contract actions are not an adequate enforcement device.
Consider Impression Products itself. Printer manufacturer Lexmark sold its
Lexmark-specific ink (toner) cartridges at a discount, provided the buyer agreed
in advance to use the cartridge only once and then return the empty cartridge to
Lexmark.16 Lexmark’s intent was not in controversy: it wished to dry up a
secondary market for spent cartridges that firms such as Impression Products
could then refill and sell, often at prices that were a small fraction of the amount
that Lexmark charged for a new cartridge.
In antitrust terms, the practice that Lexmark was attempting to enforce was
a variable proportion tying arrangement, sometimes referred to as a metering tie.
In such a tie, the buyer purchases one copy of a “tying” product, such as a printer,
but then uses varying amounts of some secondary “tied,” product, such as toner
cartridges. Under a tie, printer purchasers would be required to purchase
cartridges from Lexmark rather than from independent firms who refurbish used
cartridges. The tying firm typically drops the price of the tying product,
sometimes to zero, but raises the price of the tied product.17 Today the general,
although not unanimous, consensus among antitrust economists is that variable
proportion tying agreements are devices for facilitating second degree price
14. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
15. E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)
(holding resale price-maintenance, sometimes known as vertical price fixing, to be governed by rule of
reason); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (holding purely vertical concerted refusal to
deal, as opposed to horizontal refusal, to be governed by rule of reason).
16. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
17. See Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust
Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 943 (2010); see also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 46-47
(9th Cir. 1971) (considering tying by minor fast food franchisor with franchise fee of zero).
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discrimination, that they typically result in increased output, and that the welfare
gains that they produce exceed losses, perhaps by a wide margin.
More particularly, the practice produces two positive welfare effects on
consumers and one negative one. First, the reduction in the price of the tying
product (printers) increases its output by bringing in additional buyers who
would not be in the market otherwise. Second, low intensity users gain more
from the price cut in the tying product than the price increase in the tied product
(toner cartridges). Offsetting this, high intensity users end up paying more. The
aggregate price increase on the cartridges they buy exceeds the price cut on the
printer.
How harms and benefits net out is an empirical question and depends on
the amount of market power the tying firm enjoys in the tying product.18 The
practice can be shown to reduce welfare only if the seller is a monopolist or
perhaps is colluding with others to impose the tie.19 The one article finding a
significant possibility of welfare harm assumes a defendant with a monopoly in
the tying product and a perfectly competitive tied product.20 It finds a possible
reduction in welfare by assuming the existence of a large set of higher intensity
purchasers, as described above, who are subjected to the tying arrangement even
though it makes them worse off. The overall effect of the tie is negative if the
welfare loss suffered by these purchasers is greater than the gains experienced
by those who benefit from either the tying product output increase or the price
cut in the tied product.
In a perfectly competitive tying market, this set would be empty, however.
Those asked to subject themselves to a costly tie would simply buy their products
from a rival. In that case, the tie would be an unambiguous welfare gain. The
seller’s additional profits would come entirely from the increase in tying product
output.
The markets in which tying occurs are almost never monopolized;
although, they are not perfectly competitive either. Most are product
differentiated and at least moderately competitive. For example, Lexmark is a
relatively minor player in the highly competitive but differentiated consumer
market for laser printers. Its share was less than five percent, making it
significantly smaller than rivals Hewlett-Packard, Epson, Canon, and Brother.21
In such a market, all those customers who gain from the tie will be likely to stay
18. See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 937-940; cf. Einer Elhauge &
Barry Nalebuff, The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties, 33 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 68 (2017) (arguing that such
ties can reduce welfare in some circumstances when the seller is a tying product monopolist). In fact,
however, tying product monopolists are a rarity in the antitrust law of variable proportion ties. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Design of Production, 103 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
19. E.g., Elhauge & Nalebuff, supra note 18 (speaking repeatedly of defendant as a
“price-discriminating monopolist”).
20. Id.
21. See “Weak Demand” for Printers and Cartridges Affects Lexmark, RECYCLER
(Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.therecycler.com/posts/weak-demand-for-printers-and-cartridges-affects-
lexmark/ [http://perma.cc/29YP-XJ6D] (estimating 4.5 percent).
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in unless a rival promises even greater gains. Those for whom the tie is costly
will seek out an alternative, which will not be difficult to find.22 As a result, a
necessary but not sufficient condition for consumer harm from a variable
proportion tie is very significant market power in the tying product market. The
market must be sufficiently noncompetitive that buyers upon whom the tie
imposes losses are forced to remain subject to the tie, and their losses must
outweigh the gains that accrue to others.
Given Lexmark’s market share, its printer-cartridge tie was almost certainly
welfare increasing. At the very least, it was sufficiently ambiguous that further
inquiry into market power and competitive effects would be essential to
answering the welfare question. The Supreme Court itself recognized, however,
that it would be difficult or impossible for Lexmark to enforce a tying condition
imposed directly on consumers via breach of contract suits.23 Lexmark had even
attempted to use a microchip pairing of printer and cartridge in order to prevent
use of competitors’ cartridges, but the Sixth Circuit had refused to find copyright
violations by rivals who duplicated or invented around the chips.24 While one
might get purchasers of printers to agree not to use anything but Lexmark’s own
cartridges, there is no effective means for Lexmark to discover violations and
enforce such a contract.
By contrast, the refilling companies, such as infringement defendant
Impression Products, are fewer and must sell in publicly accessible places such
as Amazon. They could therefore be identified. However, they are not in privity
of contract with Lexmark. As a result, the ability to turn a violation of the tying
clause into a patent infringement suit was very likely the only effective
mechanism Lexmark had for enforcing its tie. With a properly posted notice,
Lexmark could warn Impression Products and other refillers that their activity
constituted patent infringement.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision very likely prevented Lexmark from
using a socially valuable device that could be expected to lower the cost of
owning and operating computer printers.25 In the Kirtsaeng case, which involved
copyright law’s statutory first sale doctrine, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion
advocated that competition policy be brought to bear. He noted Lord Coke’s
seventeenth-century statement that post-sale restraints are “against Trade and
Traffique, and bargaining and contract,” and located these concerns within
22. For example, Amazon carries thirteen brands of computer printers, including all of
the major ones—Canon, HP, Epson, Brother, Xerox, and Lexmark. See AMAZON, http://amazon.com
[http://perma.cc/P6WY-2AQJ] (search “printers”).
23. See Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1528-30 (detailing the history of Lexmark’s
attempts to enforce the tie by mechanisms other than patent infringement actions).
24. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding that defendant’s anticircumvention technology did not violate DMCA and, in any event, qualified
for the DMCA’s interoperability defense (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(3) (2018)).
25. Because customers want printing services the proper cost is the combination of
printer and cartridges that the customer uses, not of printers alone or cartridges alone. That is, the two are
strong complements.
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competition law.26 Justice Breyer’s rationale for the first sale doctrine
emphasized “the importance of leaving buyers of goods free to compete with
each other when reselling or otherwise disposing of those goods.” For that
proposition, he cited an antitrust case and an antitrust treatise.27 By contrast, in
Impression Products Chief Justice Roberts quoted the same passage from Lord
Coke,28 but emphasized its relationship to the common law’s hostility toward
restraints on the alienation of chattels, citing both Coke’s Institutes and John
Chipman Gray’s treatise on that subject.29
Seventy years after the Supreme Court applied the first sale doctrine to
copyright,30 Congress codified the doctrine in a revised Copyright Act.31
Although the patent first sale doctrine is much older,32 Congress has never done
the same thing in the Patent Act. Two statutes have spoken to the issue of patent
exhaustion, and then only indirectly. One is Section 3 of the Clayton Act, an
antitrust provision passed in response to the Supreme Court’s 1912 Henry
decision. The other, discussed later, is the Patent Misuse Reform Act.33
In Henry, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the first sale
doctrine for “conditional” sales, just as the Federal Circuit had been doing prior
to Impression Products.34 Writing for the Court, Justice Lurton explained that
the sale of a patented thing could be either unconditional or conditional. If it was
unconditional, then the exhaustion rule applied. By means of a conditional sale,
however, the patentee could “sever” any indicia of ownership that it wished, for
severability was inherent in the nature of a property right.35
The Henry Court then went on to approve enforcement of a variable
proportion tying arrangement via a patent infringement action, on facts quite
similar to those in Impression Products. Patentee A.B. Dick, a large
26. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (quoting 1 EDWARD
COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND § 360, at 223 (1628)).
27. Id. (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886
(2007); and 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 100, at 4 (3d ed. 2006)).
28. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1526.
29. Id. (citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY
§ 27, at 18 (2d ed. 1895)).
30. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 343 (1908) (judge-made exhaustion rule
for printed, copyrighted book, relying on patent exhaustion cases).
31. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2018).
32. Dating to Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852).
33. See infra notes 159-164 and accompanying discussion.
34. E.g. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(refusing to apply exhaustion to a conditional sales contract), rev’d, Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark
Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(similar), overruled by Impression Products, 137 S. Ct. 1523.
35. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1912) (“The property right to a
patented machine may pass to a purchaser with no right of use, or with only the right to use in a specified
way, or at a specified place, or for a specified purpose. The unlimited right of exclusive use which is
possessed by and guaranteed to the patentee will be granted if the sale be unconditional. But if the right
of use be confined by specific restriction, the use not permitted is necessarily reserved to the patentee. If
that reserved control of use of the machine be violated, the patent is thereby invaded. This right to sever
ownership and use is deducible from the nature of a patent monopoly and is recognized in the cases.”).
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manufacturer of office equipment, sold its patented mimeograph copy machine
subject to a clearly printed license restriction attached to each copy of the
machine. The restriction stated that the machine could be used only with paper,
ink, and stencils supplied by A.B. Dick itself.36 Because the notice was
prominently attached to each machine, one could reasonably expect it would be
communicated to subsequent users, whether or not they were in privity of
contract with the patentee. Henry was a office supply store operator who sold a
can of ink to a purchaser of the machine, knowing that the purchaser intended to
use it in violation of A.B. Dick’s condition.37
The Supreme Court concluded that exhaustion did not apply to clearly
conditional sales. Neither could it find anything in the Sherman Act, which had
been passed twenty-two years earlier, that spoke to the patent licensing practice
at issue.38 As a result, neither patent law nor antitrust law prevented enforcement
of the tie. Henry was only one of many decisions that applied patent exhaustion
selectively, depending on whether the sale of the patented good was conditional
or unconditional,39 but often paying little attention to the nature of the restriction
that the condition imposed. For its part, the Federal Circuit adhered to the
conditional use distinction, even after the Supreme Court appeared to overrule it
in its Quanta decision.40 Precision Products clearly has brought that to an end.
Whether the drafters of the Sherman Act had intended for the statute to
apply to patent ties is doubtful. The statute never mentions patents. Nevertheless,
Congress was clearly unhappy with the Henry decision. It responded, however,
36. See id. at 11:
License Restriction.
This machine is sold by the A. B. Dick Company with the license restriction that it may be used
only with the stencil paper, ink, and other supplies made by A. B. Dick Company, Chicago, U.
S. A.
37. Henry’s act was one of “contributory” infringement. Liability for contributory
infringement was subsequently (in 1952) narrowed to cover only the sale of things not capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2018). The can of ink in the Henry case almost
certainly had substantial noninfringing uses.
38. Henry, 224 U.S. at 30. The Court quoted with approval Justice Peckham’s opinion
ten years earlier in E. Bement & Son, Inc. v. National Harrow, Inc., 186 U.S. 70 (1902), that the Sherman
Act
clearly does not refer to that kind of a restraint of interstate commerce which may arise from
reasonable and legal conditions imposed upon the assignee or licensee of a patent by the owner
thereof, restricting the terms upon which the article may be used and the price to be demanded
therefor. Such a construction of the act, we have no doubt, was never contemplated by its
framers.
Id. at 92. The Bement decision went on to uphold a price fixing provision contained in a patent cross-
license.
39. E.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 356 (1961)
(dicta approving American Cotton-Tie); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895)
(applying exhaustion when the patentee “has himself constructed a machine and sold it without any
conditions”); American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (enforcing a restriction explicitly
made at the time of sale that metal tie sold for baling cotton could be used only once); Mitchell v. Hawley,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872) (“without any conditions”); Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 799 (1870) (refusing to apply exhaustion when the licensee expressly restricted
licensee to produce one type of article but licensee produced a different one).
40. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
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by amending the antitrust laws. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which was enacted
two years after Henry, made it unlawful to sell a product, “whether patented or
unpatented,” on the condition that the purchaser not deal in a competitor’s goods.
Further, it added the language “where the effect may . . . be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly”—a clear sign that it did not
intend to condemn all such tying conditions categorically, but only under a rule
of reason that distinguished competitively harmful practices.41
The one thing that Congress did not do in response to Henry was amend
patent law so as to eliminate patent exhaustion doctrine’s distinction between
conditional and unconditional sales. Rather, in the eyes of Congress in 1914,
addressing the problem of A.B. Dick’s tying arrangement was more a question
of antitrust policy than patent policy. Further, as an antitrust question, it required
an analysis of competitive effects and not a categorical rule that simply
condemned every such arrangement categorically. Thus, the most sensible
reading of the Congressional response to Henry was that it had no wish to jettison
the “condition” distinction for patent exhaustion, but it did want antitrust law to
assess competitive effects in order to determine which conditions could be
enforced and which could not be.42
II. Rationales
While competition policy may or may not provide the proper rationale for
the first sale doctrine, some policy justifying a purely judicial deviation from an
elaborate statute such as the Patent Act seems to be in order. An argument from
41. See Clayton Act § 3, ch. 323, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any
person . . . to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies,
or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding
that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.”).
In addition to Section 3 of the Clayton Act, one other statutory provision may be at least remotely
relevant to exhaustion, although that is hardly clear. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2018) (“Whoever offers to
sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”).
Under this provision, someone who sold ink for use in an A.B. Dick machine could not be guilty of
contributory infringement because the ink is capable of many noninfringing uses. That does not
necessarily mean, however, that such a seller could evade the posted license restriction at issue in that
case. In any event, the provision was enacted in 1952, forty years subsequent to Henry.
42. The language requiring proof of anticompetitive effects distinguished tying from
resale price maintenance (RPM), which was unlawful per se at the time and would remain so for nearly a
century. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (holding that resale
price maintenance was per se unlawful under antitrust law); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339
(1908) (holding that a resale price maintenance condition was unenforceable under copyright exhaustion
doctrine). As a result, all RPM agreements were both exhausted, assuming the conditions for exhaustion
applied, and unenforceable as breach of contract actions.
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congressional intent seems very weak. In his opinion for the Court in Impression
Products, Chief Justice Roberts made something of the fact that Congress has
had numerous opportunities to amend the Patent Act so as to eliminate or limit
judge made exhaustion, but had never done so.43 While factually true, it need not
lead to the conclusion that the Chief Justice drew. For example, the Supreme
Court created a judge-made exhaustion rule for copyright in 1908 in the Bobbs-
Merrill case. Congress validated that decision nearly seventy years later by
making the doctrine statutory.44 In the case of the Patent Act, however, Congress
has neither statutorily recognized the doctrine nor statutorily repudiated it. So
one could as easily conclude that it was indifferent. It is also clear that Congress
has never responded to the “conditional” sales distinction that has appeared
repeatedly in the cases, including Henry. In fact, for tying cases, Congress
subsequently embraced it.45 In sum, one cannot conclude from congressional
behavior that Congress wanted the absolute exhaustion rule that Impression
Products developed.
Further, the one policy rationale on which the Impression Products Court
rested—a policy against restraints on alienation—seems poorly suited to the
situation, for reasons to be discussed later.46 Prior to that, many of the Supreme
Court’s first sale decisions stated a rationale, but these were often quite different
from one another. The rationales were as follows.
A. Retroactive Extensions of the Patent Term
The first decision to apply the patent exhaustion rule, Bloomer v.
McQuewan, had a clear and principled rationale which was followed in one
subsequent case and then abandoned because it was so specific to particular
legislative facts.47 The patentee, William Woodworth, owned a very important
patent on a wood planing machine, which was also one of the most frequently
litigated patents in the nineteenth century.48 As the patent neared its expiration,
Woodworth lobbied Congress and received a retroactive extension of the patent
term in the 1836 Patent Act.49 Woodworth died in 1839, but his son was able to
obtain a second extension in an Act of Congress that applied only to his patent,
43. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2018).
45. See discussion infra text at notes 158-163.
46. See discussion infra notes 109-134.
47. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852).
48. On the importance of the Woodworth planning patent, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Emergence of Classical Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 263, 289-291 (2016), and see also Carolyn C.
Cooper, A Patent Transformation: Woodworking Mechanization in Philadelphia, 1830-1856 at 278, 295-
315, in EARLY AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY: MAKING AND DOING THINGS FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO
1850 (Judith A. McGaw, ed., 1994), which includes illustrations of Woodworth’s machine.
49. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, repealed by Act of July 8, 1870, ch.
230, §§ 59, 111, 16 Stat. 198, 207, 216. In Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646 (1846), a divided
Supreme Court had dismissed a challenge to the statutory extension, giving a detailed history of the
Woodworth patent and the litigation under it.
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mentioned by name.50 Bloomer was a manufacturing licensee under the patent,
and McQuewan was a purchaser/user of at least one of the machines. The
original patent term had expired during McQuewan’s ownership of the machine,
and McQuewan had accordingly stopped paying royalties. When the patent was
retroactively extended, however, Bloomer demanded that McQuewan pay
royalties again for the remaining life of the revived patent.51 The question before
the Supreme Court was whether the extension of the patent term served to extend
the royalty obligation retroactively to buyers, who had purchased the patented
product, agreeing to pay royalties for the life of the patent under the shorter term
in effect at the time of their purchase.
The case thus implicated concerns similar to those expressed in the
Contract Clause of the Constitution—that is, of legislative rewriting of an
executed contract so as to make its terms less favorable to one of the parties.52
The Contract Clause applies only to the states, however, and patent law is
federal. Chief Justice Taney rather creatively attached Contract Clause concerns
to the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, creating what many people regard
as the historical foundation for Substantive Due Process analysis, which
developed in the state courts thirty years later:
The right to construct and use these planing machines, had been purchased and
paid for without any limitation as to the time for which they were to be used. They
were the property of the respondents [i.e., McQuewan, the purchaser of the
machine]. Their only value consists in their use. And a special act of Congress,
passed afterwards, depriving the appellees of the right to use them, certainly could
not be regarded as due process of law.
Congress undoubtedly have power to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries.
But it does not follow that Congress may, from time to time, as often as they think
proper, authorize an inventor to recall rights which he had granted to others; or
reinvest in him rights of property which he had before conveyed for a valuable
and fair consideration.53
50. An Act to extend a patent heretofore granted to William Woodworth, 6 Stat. 936
(1845).
51. On the general outcry of users over the retroactive patent extensions, see The
Woodworth Patent Extension Scheme, 11 SCI. AM. 277 (1856). See also H.R. REP. NO. 31-150
(1850); H.R. REP. NO. 32-156 (1852); Petition of Three Hundred Citizens of Wheeling, Virginia, as well
as summaries of other petitions, collected in Representative John Otis, Speech of Hon. John Otis, of
Maine, and the Minority Report of the Committee on Patents Made by Him, on the Subject of Woodworth’s
Patent for a Planing Machine, and Against the Bill for Extending that Patent, U.S. House of Reps. (Mar.
27, 1850), in 89 CONG. & POLIT. PAMPHLET (1850)..
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
53. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553 (1852).
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The issue of a legislated retroactive patent term extension subsequent to the
sale of a patented product makes Bloomer relatively unique among patent
exhaustion cases. Bloomer’s rational is also absolutely consistent with the Patent
Act’s purpose, which is to promote innovation. A retroactive patent term
extension cannot incentivize innovation, because the affected technology has
already been invented. Assuming that a judge-made patent law rule must fall
within the constitutional authorization created in the IP Clause, the Bloomer
rationale qualified.
Mitchell v. Hawley, decided twenty years later, also applied something akin
to the first sale doctrine to hold that the retroactive term extension created in the
1836 Patent Act did not revive the right to an injunction against someone who
purchased the patented good under the original term.54 No subsequent patent
exhaustion case has implicated a retroactive term extension or Congressional
modification of an existing license agreement.55
The facts of Bloomer thus make it a one-off, forcing later decisions to look
for different rationales. Justice Miller’s opinion in Adams v. Burke,56 the
Supreme Court’s next major patent exhaustion decision, is notable for both its
brevity and its formalism. Further, it is not clear that the decision implicated the
first sale doctrine at all. The patentee had licensed various manufacturers to make
its coffin lids in designated parts of the country. These licenses to manufacture
did not implicate the first sale doctrine because nothing was being sold. Indeed,
territorially restricted production licenses are expressly authorized by the Patent
Act, at least when they are domestic.57 Adams was not a coffin manufacturer but
an undertaker. He legally purchased a finished coffin containing the patented lid
from a manufacturer who had a territorially restricted license.
The lawsuit was apparently based on the premise that, because the
manufacturer was licensed to produce the coffin lids and sell them in a
designated area, the purchaser/user implicitly operated under the same
limitation. Nevertheless, the sale from the manufacturing licensee to Adams was
“without condition or restriction.”58 In contrast to this assumption, the
presumptive antitrust rule for territorial restrictions has always been that a
restriction on an intermediary does not automatically extend to the end user. For
example, an automobile dealer location clause restricts the area in which the
54. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544 (1872).
55. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding a statutory copyright term
extension in an action brought by users of copyrighted works which had fallen into the public domain but
were revived by the extension). However, it appears that no petitioner alleged that he or she had purchased
a work under an ongoing royalty requirement which had lapsed but which the term extension had now
revived.
56. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
57. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2018) (granting patentee the right to “grant and convey an
exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United
States”).
58. See Adams, 84 U.S. at 454-55. The lower court contains somewhat more elaboration
but describes the license and sale in the same way. See Adams v. Burks, 1 F. Cas. 100 (C.C.D. Mass.
1871).
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dealer can sell a car,59 but the clause itself does not serve to restrict the area in
which the dealer’s customers can drive the car nor whether customers can resell
it as a used car. A franchise contract such as one for McDonald’s almost certainly
includes a location restriction imposed on the franchisee, but no court has ever
held that such a clause requires the customer to eat her hamburger inside the
store. So one thing missing from Adams was an analysis of the reach-through
effect of the territorial restriction—i.e., whether it applied only to the
manufacturer or also to someone who subsequently purchased from the
manufacturer.
Nevertheless, the premise of Justice Bradley’s dissent was the ancient
property law principle that one cannot convey a greater title than he owns:
If it be contended that the right of vending the lids to others enables them to confer
upon their vendees the right to use the lids thus sold outside of the limited district,
the question at once arises, how can they confer upon their vendees a right which
they cannot exercise themselves? The only consistent construction to be given to
such an assignment is, to limit all the privileges conferred by it to the district
marked out. It is an assignment of the manufacture and use of the patented article
within that district, and within that district only.60
The plaintiff in Adams was a different licensee, whose manufacturing
license covered the territory in which Adams buried the coffin in question.61 The
patentee had assigned exclusive territories to manufacturing licensees, but did so
by conveying the entire interest in the patent to each licensee.62 Adams, the
undertaker, apparently had a license only by virtue of the fact that the purchaser
of a patented good always receives an implied license to practice the patent to
the extent of using that good.63 The patent itself was minor, although perhaps not
trivial. Coffins of the day bore a small metal plate stating the decedent’s name
and other information. Traditionally, the plate was on the lid, however, and could
be seen by mourners only when the lid was closed. The patentee cut a notch in
the lid between the hinges that permitted the name plate to be viewed when the
lid was either open or closed, thus making the plate viewable in open casket
funerals.64
59. E.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (imposing territorial
restriction on a large truck distributor).
60. Adams, 84 U.S. at 458-59 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
61. See Adams v. Burkes, 1 F. Cas. 100, 100 (C.C.D. Mass. 1871).
62. Adams, 84 U.S. at 458 (noting that the patentees “did assign to Lockhart & Seelye,
of Cambridge, in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, all the right, title, and interest which the said
patentees had in the invention described in the said letters-patent, for, to, and in a circle whose radius is
ten miles, having the city of Boston as a centre”).
63. See supra note 4.




B. Distinguishing Unconditional from Conditional Licenses
The lower court’s opinion in Adams, which the Supreme Court affirmed,
also contained the language that the Federal Circuit came to rely on in its own
exhaustion jurisprudence,65 but which the Supreme Court rejected in Impression
Products. The Adams Circuit Court held that “[w]hen a patented product passes
lawfully into the hands of a purchaser without condition or restriction, it is no
longer within the monopoly or under the protection of the patent act, but outside
of it.”66 In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court characterized the Adams
decision in that way and expressly followed its reasoning.67
After Adams, courts justified patent exhaustion with several different,
sometimes overlapping rationales. Commentators have also inferred rationales
that were not often expressed in judicial decisions, although they may have been
implied. One rationale was based on the distinction between conditional and
unconditional sales that Adams, Henry, and numerous other decisions stated. A
second was a concern that the law of patented things (as opposed to the law of
patents) needed to be reserved to the extent possible to other bodies of law, such
as commercial law—or more pointedly, to the states.68 A third rationale,
articulated frequently after the Clayton Act was passed, was that the first sale
doctrine served to limit anticompetitive vertical agreements, and thus pulled in
tandem with both the antitrust laws and the developing patent “misuse”
doctrine.69 Finally, concerns about outlawing restraints on the alienation of
chattels were acknowledged, but only infrequently. The concern with restraints
on alienation was articulated more often in copyright law as well as the
developing antitrust law of vertical restraints. In the latter, it formed the rationale
for the set of per se rules against vertical restrictions that the Supreme Court
initially developed but later largely rejected.70
Historically, the most frequently stated rationale for the first sale doctrine
was a version of the one that the Federal Circuit was following at the time of
Impression Products, which distinguished unconditional from conditional sales
65. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
66. Adams v. Burks, 1 Holmes 40, 1 F.Cas. 100, 100 (C.C.D.Ma. 1871).
67. Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355, 362 (1893) (“[I]n Adams v. Burke it was assumed
that the patented coffin lids were first lawfully sold to the purchaser, without condition or restriction.”);
accord Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872) (“[A] patentee, when he has himself
constructed a machine and sold it without any conditions, or authorized another to construct, sell, and
deliver it, or to construct and use and operate it, without any conditions, and the consideration has been
paid to him for the thing patented, the rule is well established that the patentee must be understood to have
parted to that extent with all his exclusive right, and that he ceases to have any interest whatever in the
patented machine.”); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895) (quoting Mitchell on
this point); see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917)
(holding that the Patent Act’s exclusive right to vend “is exhausted by a single, unconditional sale, the
article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law . . . .”).
68. See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying discussion.
69. See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying discussion.
70. See infra notes 128-134 and accompanying discussion.
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of patented things. Once a patentee had made an unconditional sale of a patented
thing, then any use restriction imposed on the purchaser was unenforceable. On
the other hand, conditional sales should be enforced when the limiting condition
was clear and simultaneous with (or announced prior to) the sale.
The common law had always recognized that property owners could
transfer something less than their “entire” interest in property, and patents were
no exception. Speaking for the Supreme Court, Justice Peckham observed this in
the 1902 Bement Harrow case, which upheld patent cross-licenses issued on the
condition that the parties set a specific price for their patented harrows.71 The
“general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent
laws.”72 He wrote:
The very object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions,
that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this
kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the
right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts. The
fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices does
not render them illegal.73
The distinction between conditional and unconditional sales effectively
turns the patent exhaustion rule into a drafting problem, at least to the extent that
the particular condition does not violate antitrust law or some other legal policy.
As the Federal Circuit articulated it in its now-overruled Mallinckrodt decision,
the “principle of exhaustion of the patent right did not turn a conditional sale into
an unconditional one.”74 The court then noted numerous Supreme Court
decisions that had rested exhaustion on the distinction between conditional and
unconditional sales75 and concluded that:
Adams v. Burke and its kindred cases do not stand for the proposition that no
restriction or condition may be placed upon the sale of a patented article . . . .
Unless the condition violates some other law or policy (in the patent field, notably
the misuse or antitrust law), private parties retain the freedom to contract
concerning conditions of sale.76
As Mallinckrodt read the twentieth-century case law, the decisions refusing
to enforce a post-sale restriction even when a clear condition had been stated did
71. Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
72. Id. at 91.
73. Id.
74. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated
by Impression Prods., Inc. v Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
75. Id. at 706-07.
76. Id. at 708 (citation omitted).
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not rest on the first sale doctrine at all, but rather on the conclusion that the
particular condition being asserted amounted to misuse or an antitrust violation.77
C. Trading Off Duration and Enforcement Scope
When a practice such as tying, exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance,
or something else is found unlawful under the antitrust laws, it is typically
condemned no matter whether it is enforceable by contract or infringement
action. But does a class of restraints exist that, while enforceable by breach of
contract action, should not be enforceable by infringement suit? On the one hand,
the duration of a restraint enforced by contract is as long as the contract is
enforceable, perhaps indefinitely. That is also true of trademarks and trade
secrets, whose duration is indefinite. By contrast, a restraint enforceable by a
patent infringement action can last no longer than the enforceable life of the
patent. So if the duration of the restraint is an important factor, the patent
infringement suit has the advantage.78
On the other hand, because infringement actions do not require privity of
contract, they can reach a broader set of potential defendants. However, that is
not a bad thing, unless enforcement itself is socially harmful. As noted earlier, if
the restraint at issue is welfare increasing, then enforcement via infringement
actions is preferable to no enforcement at all. The current law of exhaustion does
not make any of these distinctions. Once a qualifying sale occurs, the post-sale
restraint is unenforceable, no matter what its consequences for welfare,
competition, or innovation.
D. Preserving Room for the Law of Patented Things—Concerns for Federalism
Duffy and Hynes argue that the central purpose of the exhaustion doctrine
is to preserve space for other areas of law, such as commercial law.79 Under this
rationale, the Patent Act creates a regime for controlling patents, but other bodies
77. Patent “misuse” is another judge-made set of rules that refuse to enforce patents that
have been “misused,” most typically by tying or some related practice. On patent misuse and its relation
to antitrust, see 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1782 (4th ed.
forthcoming 2018).
78. Then-Sixth Circuit Judge Lurton made this point in his opinion in the Dr. Miles
resale price maintenance case which the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed. RPM enforced through
IP licensing, he observed, “has a limitation of a few years” and requires the inventor to put his invention
on record. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 164 F. 803, 806 (6th Cir. 1908), aff’d, 220
U.S. 373 (1911). By contrast, speaking of a price restraint enforceable by a contract action:
Not so with the monopoly asked for by those who control the enormous proprietary trade of this
country. Their monopoly will go on forever, and, if there be merit in their formula, they may
not only preserve it through all time, but continue to restrain prices and prevent competition in
the sale of the product. It is said that the proprietor of such a secret remedy need never
communicate his formula.
Id.
79. John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1 (2016).
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of law control the use, sale, and deployment of patented things. For example, an
insecticide might be patented, with composition and right to manufacture
controlled by the Patent Act. Nevertheless, numerous other bodies of law govern
the use, production, and sale of the insecticide itself—the enforceability of sales
contracts and remedies for breach, the conditions under which it may be
manufactured, whether and when it can be used or even whether it can be used
at all,80 how it is to be sold, anticompetitive restraints on its sale, or how it must
be labeled.
This is an intuitively appealing rationale for patent exhaustion. It is not a
rationale that the courts have often articulated, however—at least not in the form
that Duffy and Hynes describe it. Another problem is that it creates a kind of
ratchet. Patent exhaustion makes room for alternative bodies of law when they
are more restrictive. It does so less well when they are more permissive. For
example, exhaustion accommodated the concerns of antitrust quite well when
antitrust was on an expansion course, making per se unenforceable what antitrust
was also making per se unlawful. The two most important categories were tying
arrangements and resale price maintenance, which were two of the practices
most frequently involved in first sale situations. Both were historically unlawful
per se. However, when antitrust changed course and began to see these practices
as more benign or even as economically efficient, the first sale doctrine went
right on denying enforcement, as it did in the Impression Products case. As noted
earlier, to the extent that the variable proportion print/cartridge tie at issue in
Impression Products is socially efficient and cannot effectively be enforced by a
breach of contract suit, the first sale doctrine serves to frustrate rather than
support antitrust goals.
I have proposed a variation, which I believe is more faithful to the historical
development of the patent exhaustion doctrine. Further, it was widely cited by
the courts as the rationale. The purpose of the exhaustion doctrine was to
preserve the boundary between the federal law of patents and the largely state
law of patented things.81 During the nineteenth century patent law increasingly
became federal, although the Supreme Court would not get around to preempting
state issued patents until the 1960s.82 A frequently articulated rationale for patent
exhaustion during that time was that the doctrine served to distinguish between
the federal law of patents, as covered by the Patent Act and IP Clause of the
Constitution, from state law governing the sale and use of patented objects. The
80. See, e.g., Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878) (holding that the fact that a fuel
oil was patented did not defend against state statute prohibiting its use as unsafe); see also Webber v.
Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347 (1880) (“The patent for a dynamite powder does not prevent the State from
prescribing the conditions of its manufacture, storage, and sale, so as to protect the community from the
danger of explosion. A patent for the manufacture and sale of a deadly poison does not lessen the right of
the State to control its handling and use.”).
81. Hovenkamp, supra note 8.
82. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). On the history of federal exclusivity, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Emergence of Classical Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 263 (2016).
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Tenth Amendment guarantees that powers not delegated to Congress under the
IP Clause or potentially overlapping provisions such as the Commerce Clause
should be reserved to the states.83
Chief Justice White articulated this position very forcefully in his dissent
from the Supreme Court’s Henry decision, which approved a variable proportion
patent tie accomplished by a conditional sale.84 Speaking of the majority’s
holding that the Patent Act entitled the patentee to enforce its tie via an
infringement action, White complained that the effect was
to destroy, in a very large measure, the judicial authority of the states by
unwarrantedly extending the Federal judicial power . . . . [T]he gravity of the
consequences which would ordinarily arise from such a result is greatly
aggravated by the ruling now made, since that ruling not only vastly extends the
Federal judicial power, as above stated, but as to all the innumerable subjects to
which the ruling may be made to apply, makes it the duty of the courts of the
United States to test the rights and obligations of the parties, not by the general
law of the land, in accord with the conformity act, but by the provisions of the
patent law, even although the subjects considered may not be within the embrace
of that law, thus disregarding the state law, overthrowing, it may be, the settled
public policy of the State, and injuriously affecting a multitude of persons.85
As the Chief Justice realized, because a condition in a patent license could
be drafted to cover everything a contract could cover, the impact of not finding
exhaustion would be to federalize state commercial law, state competition law,
or any other body of state law having to do with the use or sale of patented things.
As Henry was being written in 1912, state antitrust laws were just starting to deal
with practices such as resale price maintenance and tying.86 Federal law had
already condemned resale price maintenance,87 but there was as yet no federal
antitrust law of tying. The Henry ruling permitting A.B. Dick to enforce its tying
restriction effectively preempted any state law attempt to condemn such ties.
That is why Congress responded two years later by making anticompetitive ties
subject to federal law.88 In sum, the logic of Henry enabled federal infringement
law to ride roughshod over state law.
Chief Justice White was hardly the first to see patent exhaustion in terms
of federalism. In fact, his dissent reflected a view stated in several court opinions
83. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
84. Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
85. Id. at 49-50 (White, C.J., dissenting).
86. See Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 89 N.E. 189 (Mass. 1909) (applying state antitrust
law to exclusive dealing); In re Op. of the Justices, 81 N.E. 142, 145 (Mass. 1907) (concluding that a state
law condemning patent ties would be constitutional if passed); Commonwealth v. Strauss, 78 N.E. 136
(Mass. 1906) (applying state antitrust law to exclusive dealing); Tex. Brewing Co. v. Meyer, 38 S.W. 263
(Tex. 1896) (holding similar); see also Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 41 S.E. 553, 559 (Ga. 1902)
(condemning resale price maintenance under state antitrust law); Klingel’s Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme,
64 A. 1029, 1029-30 (Md. 1906) (holding the same).
87. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 405 (1911).
88. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012).
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that stretched back to the mid-nineteenth century. That view, quite simply, was
that when a device was sold it passed from the patent law written by Congress to
the domain of state common and statutory law governing the sale and use of
goods. This was an essential mechanism for identifying the boundary between
the power granted by the IP clause of the Constitution to the federal government
and state power to control commerce in everything that federal law did not
embrace.
In 1859, the Supreme Court defined patent exhaustion, stating that “[b]y a
valid sale and purchase, the patented machine becomes the private individual
property of the purchaser, and is no longer protected by the laws of the United
States, but by the laws of the State in which it is situated.”89 The Supreme Court
and lower courts repeated that formulation many times in patent exhaustion cases
during the latter half of the nineteenth century and first quarter of the twentieth
century.90 It was used at least twice by the Supreme Court in variable proportion
patent tying cases similar to Henry and Impression Products and several
additional times by lower federal courts.91 In all of these cases, the courts cited
these concerns for federalism, virtually always quoting the language from
Chaffee.
As in so many areas, these concerns for federalism disappeared during the
Progressive Era and the New Deal.92 Federal authority over patented things
expanded, most notably under the antitrust laws, but also later under the
expansion of federal Commerce Clause power recognized in Wickard v.
Filburn.93 Beginning with the Motion Picture case in 1917, the Court
increasingly saw the exhaustion doctrine as a complement, not so much to state
commercial law, but rather to federal antitrust law.94
E. Competition Concerns Rationalizing Exhaustion
In Henry, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Sherman Act
had anything to say about the variable proportion patent tie at issue in that case.
Congress passed the Clayton Act two years later, however, mentioning patents
for the first time in an antitrust law. In its first subsequent exhaustion case,
Motion Picture Patents, the Supreme Court found linkage and rejected the
89. Chaffee v. Bos. Belting Co., 63 U.S. (22 How.) 217, 223 (1859).
90. The decisions are collected in Hovenkamp, supra note 81.
91. Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425
(1894) (holding that exhaustion applied to a tie of patented toilet paper dispenser to toilet paper); Wilson
v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109 (1850) (holding that a purchaser of Woodworth planning machine had right to
replace worn out blades with those of his own making); Wagner Typewriter Co. v. F.S. Webster Co., 144
F. 405 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906) (holding the same for a tie of typewriter to typewriter ribbons); Aiken v.
Manchester Print Works, 1 F. Cas. 245, 246-247 (C.C.D.N.H. 1865) (holding the same for a tie of patented
knitting machine to disposable knitting needles).
92. On this point, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW:
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970, at 290-292 (2015).
93. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
94. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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“condition” distinction.95 The Clayton Act served to “confirm” the Court’s view
that the patent tie requiring users of the patentee’s projector to show only its
films was both unenforceable under the exhaustion rule and an antitrust
violation.96 Justice Holmes dissented, making clear that he would have preserved
the distinction between conditional and unconditional sales.97
For some time thereafter, antitrust policy and the first sale doctrine pulled
in tandem, culminating in the Univis Lens decision in 1942.98 After that, the
Supreme Court abandoned patent exhaustion jurisprudence for sixty-five years.99
Univis sold patented, unground lens blanks for making bifocal eyeglasses,
together with a license for a process patent for grinding them. The sales
agreement required resellers of the finished lenses to sell them at a stipulated
minimum price. The Court held that the condition was unenforceable under the
first sale doctrine, but also that it violated the Sherman Act. While the Court cited
the principal patent exhaustion cases, it followed the Motion Picture case and
omitted the distinction between conditional and unconditional sales. The Court’s
2008 Quanta Computer decision was insufficiently clear about the condition
requirement,100 but Impression Products categorically rejected it.101 In his
opinion for the Court in Kirtsaeng, Justice Breyer also expressly tied copyright
exhaustion policy to antitrust policy.102
One feature of the antitrust rationale for exhaustion is that it does not treat
the “sale” of the patented good as important. That is, if antitrust doctrine applies
at all, it applies to both contract enforcement and to conditions attached to the
sale of patented goods. Section 3 of the Clayton Act makes this clear with its use
of “condition or understanding” as the relevant term signifying agreement.
Further, the Clayton Act expressly references leases as well as sales.103
Beginning with Motion Picture Patents, Section 3 of the Clayton Act has been
95. Id. at 514. As in Henry, the condition was clearly stated in a notice affixed to each
projector sold.
96. Id. at 517 (“We are confirmed in the conclusion which we are announcing by the
fact that since the decision of Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. supra, the Congress of the United States, the source
of all rights under patents, as if in response to this decision, has enacted a law making it unlawful for any
person engaged in interstate commerce ‘to lease or make a sale . . . .” (citing Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (2018)).
97. Id. at 519-20 (“Generally speaking, the measure of a condition is the consequence
of a breach, and if that consequence is one that the owner may impose unconditionally, he may impose it
conditionally upon a certain event.”).
98. United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
99. The next Supreme Court decision was Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics,
Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
100. Id. at 637.
101. See Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (“We
conclude that a patentee’s decision to sell a product exhausts all of its patent rights in that item, regardless
of any restrictions the patentee purports to impose or the location of the sale.”).
102. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (linking the policy
against restraints on alienation to antitrust policy).
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018) (“It shall be unlawful . . . to lease or make a sale or
contract for . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor . . . .”).
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applied to both patented and unpatented goods and to both leases and sales.104
The only limitation on domain is that the sale be one of “goods” or
“commodities.” That is, the provision does not apply to services.105
Of course, if patent exhaustion applied only to restraints that violated the
antitrust laws anyway, then there would be little independent need for an
exhaustion doctrine. The antitrust laws would already be doing by statute what
the patent exhaustion rule was intended to do. In any event, this is not the law
under Impression Products. That decision refused to enforce a variable
proportion tying restriction that antitrust law today would almost certainly
approve, particularly given the lack of any evidence that Lexmark possessed
market power. The Patent Act itself requires market power to make a patent tie
unlawful.106 By contrast, exhaustion applies to any post-sale restraint, even one
with no anticompetitive or anti-innovation consequences whatsoever.
Also worth noting is that turning practices such as patent ties into antitrust
violations considerably broadens enforcement, enabling the government or
private plaintiffs to challenge the practices directly rather than wait for a patent
infringement suit. Prior to Univis, patent exhaustion appeared only as a defense
to an infringement or contributory infringement action. There was no private
right to sue a patentee for violating the exhaustion rule. A declaratory judgment
action might possibly have worked,107 but the federal statute authorizing them
was not passed until 1934.108 By contrast, Univis was an antitrust enforcement
action brought by the United States to restrain enforcement of the post-sale
condition in question as unlawful resale price maintenance. Even if the Court
had not applied exhaustion the defendant would have lost on antitrust grounds.
F. Policing Restraints on Alienation
The Impression Products decision drew its rationale for exhaustion almost
exclusively from the common law’s hostility toward restraints on alienation.
Chief Justice Roberts relied on two common law sources. One was Lord Coke’s
104. E.g., IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (applying Section 3 of the Clayton
Act to a defendant who leased its computing machines and required lessee to purchase paper data cards
from itself); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922) (applying Section 3 of
Clayton Act to tying clauses in leases of shoe machinery).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018) (referring to “goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented”).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (“No patent owner . . . shall be denied relief or deemed guilty
of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . conditioned the license of any
rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another
patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market
power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is
conditioned.”); see also discussion accompanying infra notes 158-163 (arguing that this provision limits
exhaustion).
107. But see Cont’l Auto. GmbH v. iBiquity Dig. Corp., 14-c-1799, 2015 WL 859569
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2015) (holding that a declaratory judgment action cannot be brought against a practice
that does not arise under federal law, but that is asserted only as a defense).
108. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (2018).
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early seventeenth century treatise, Institutes of the Lawes of England.109 The
other was the writings of John Chipman Gray, a Harvard Professor, close friend
of Holmes, and eminent authority on common law restraints on alienation.
Gray had actually written two important legal treatises dealing with
restraints on property: Restraints on the Alienation of Property110 and The Rule
Against Perpetuities.111 The fact that he wrote two rather large books on the
subject suggests that the legal rules governing restraints on alienation were
significantly more nuanced than Impression Products and other patent
exhaustion decisions describe them. In fact, there was no simple rule that all
restraints on alienation, even on personal property, were unenforceable. Rather,
the legal status of the restraint depended on a number of things, such as the type
of property, whether real or personal; the nature of the interest being conveyed,
whether vested or contingent; the length of the term of the underlying
conveyance; the nature of the restraint; and the duration of the restraint itself.
Further, only a subset of restraints were on “alienation” as such, although many
more might affect market value.
For example, Gray’s Restraints on Alienation includes a section on
restraints that were “Qualified as to Time,”112 indicating that many time-limited
restraints were approved. This is important because patent law’s exhaustion
doctrine applies to enforcement via patent infringement actions, which ordinarily
can be maintained only against conduct that occurs during the enforcement life
of the patent. So by definition, the time limit is fairly short—less than twenty
years in the typical case, and certainly short by the standards of the common law.
As Gray famously stated it, the common law rule against perpetuities was that
“no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”113 A skilled drafter could
tie up property for a century or more under the rule.114 Gray suggested a shorter
rule for express restraints on alienation, which is that the condition, “if broken at
all must have been broken in the lifetime of the first taker.”115 He also discussed
several cases, however, approving restraints that lasted into the second
generation.116 With respect to U.S. law, Gray found a great deal of controversy
109. 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND § 360, at 223 (1628).
110. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed.
1895).
111. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1886).
112. GRAY, supra note 110, §§ 45, at 33.
113. GRAY, supra note 111, § 201.
114. For example, a grant that kept an interest in the family “until twenty years
following the death of the survivor of my three grandchildren, Peter, Paul, and Mary” would restrain
alienation until twenty years after the last of these three grandchildren died. If Mary, the survivor, was
three at the time the interest was created and lived to be 93, the interest would have been tied up for 90 +
20, or 110 years.
115. Gray, supra note 110, § 47, at 34.
116. E.g., id. (citing Pearson v. Dolman, L.R., 3 Eq. 315 (1866) (Eng.) (upholding a
restraint on alienation of a fund for which alienation was restrained until the grantee turned twenty-five,
even though the grantee died prior to his twenty-fifth birthday)).
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over the legal effect of restraints “confined to a limited period,” with a majority
stating that they were good.117 Gray himself believed that a more restrictive rule
was better.118
This is not the place to rehearse the common law of restraints on alienation
of property. Clearly, however, a blanket rule that any sale of a patented article
forecloses subsequent enforcement of a restraint shorter than twenty years is an
egregious exaggeration of the common law’s position.119 Further, only a small
subset of the restraints to which patent exhaustion has been applied are properly
classified as restraints on “alienation.” Most of them are more properly described
as use limitations, governing such things as limitations to a single use,120
limitations on the types of components with which the restrained product may
be used,121 or territorial limitations on where a product can be used.122 The
particular restriction that comes closest to a restraint on alienation is resale price
maintenance clauses, which specify the minimum price at which a restrained
good can be resold.123 Even these, however, are not prohibitions on alienation,
but rather limitations on the price of alienation.124 Indeed, resale price
maintenance is imposed only on resellers, thus contemplating that the product is
going to be resold.
Applying Gray’s concern about alienation restraints also takes the common
law’s concern completely out of its established context. The common law
doctrine was addressed to issues concerning the preservation of family wealth.
Nothing in Gray suggests application to either intellectual property transfers or,
more generally, to restraints governing commercial distribution. Restraints such
as those in Impression Products or the other antitrust and patent cases where the
doctrine has been cited arise in the context of distribution schemes that
contemplate that the good will be resold. Their purpose is not to restrain
alienation in the common law sense at all, but only to channel or direct the way
that a good is distributed. Further, we apply antitrust’s rule of reason to such
restraints because we believe that most of them serve to increase rather than
117. GRAY, supra note 110, at §§ 52-53.
118. Id. at § 54.
119. The copyright rule may be more justifiable, given the Copyright Act’s current
duration of life of the author plus seventy years for most sole-authored works. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2018).
120. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (striking
down a prohibition on refilling empty toner cartridge); Am. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89
(1882) (upholding a similar provision); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(upholding a single use limitation).
121. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (striking down a
restraint limiting use of device with competitors’ components).
122. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873) (striking down a territorial limitation).
123. E.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (striking down a
resale price maintenance clause); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (holding the same in
the copyright context).
124. Gray’s own position on price restraints was more benign. See GRAY, supra note
110, § 81 (observing cases that upheld restraints that required rights of first refusal to specified buyers
willing to match the price).
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decrease sales volume. A restraint reasonably intended to increase sales cannot
seriously be called a restraint on alienation.125
In sum, Impression Products, Kirtsaeng, and other cases that have adopted
a restraint on alienation approach to exhaustion are not following anything
resembling the common law on the subject. Rather, they are fashioning a much
more draconian federal common law governing post-sale restraints on patented
articles, categorically barring them.
Fashioning a new federal common law of restraints on alienation is not
what Impression Products and Kirtsaeng purport to be doing, however. Rather,
Impression Products defined the exhaustion rule as “mark[ing] the point where
patent rights yield to the common law principle against restraints on
alienation.”126 Kirtsaeng did very much the same thing, citing the exhaustion rule
as “a common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree.”127
Using the common law of restraints on alienation to justify the draconian
Impression Products rule also flies in the face of more than a century of
development in the antitrust law of restricted distribution. Antitrust courts
historically cited a policy against restraints on alienation to justify harsh, per se
rules condemning vertical practices such as resale price maintenance and vertical
nonprice restraints. For example, the 1911 Dr. Miles decision cited the same two
sources as Impression Products, Coke and Gray, identifying a policy against
restraints on alienation as justifying the now overruled per se rule against resale
price maintenance.128 In its Leegin decision overruling Dr. Miles, the Court
briefly traced out the changing attitudes toward restricted distribution that had
made the Dr. Miles rationale obsolete.129
In its quickly overruled Schwinn decision, the Court also stated a policy
against restraints on alienation as justifying a per se rule against vertical
territorial restraints.130 That concern was necessary in order to prevent
“open[ing] the door to exclusivity of outlets and limitation of territory.”131 In his
dissent Justice Stewart accused the Court of embracing a common law rule
“merely on grounds of its antiquity.”132 There is much to be said for Stewart’s
observation. The majority’s concern reflected a classical regime in which
relatively small producers were seen as placing goods on the market unrestricted,
125. See Hovenkamp, supra note 18.
126. Impression Prods., 137 S. Ct. at 1531.
127. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363.
128. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 405 (1911),
overruled by Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
129. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889-90.
130. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont’l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
131. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 380 (“But to allow this freedom where the manufacturer has
parted with dominion over the goods—the usual marketing situation—would violate the ancient rule
against restraints on alienation and open the door to exclusivity of outlets and limitation of territory further
than prudence permits.”).
132. Id. at 391 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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and these then passed anonymously from hand to hand until they ended up with
consumers. Modern distribution systems that involve complex products,
dedicated aftermarket parts, warranty and ongoing customer service, and brand
specificity and trademark licensing were simply not a part of that picture. As
Stewart complained:
Centuries ago, it could perhaps be assumed that a manufacturer had no legitimate
interest in what happened to his products once he had sold them to a middleman
and they had started their way down the channel of distribution. But this
assumption no longer holds true in a day of sophisticated marketing policies, mass
advertising, and vertically integrated manufacturer-distributors . . . . [T]he state
of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before us:
the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the
American economy today.133
When the Supreme Court reversed itself a decade later, placing vertical
nonprice restraints under the rule of reason, it disclaimed the Schwinn Court’s
reliance on a policy against restraints on alienation as “both a misreading of legal
history and a perversion of antitrust analysis.”134
No good reason exists why the appropriate rule for patent policy should be
any different from the rule for antitrust policy. Indeed, one phenomenon that has
accompanied the rise of restricted distribution systems is the significantly
increased use of all types of intellectual property rights, both to protect
innovation and to create product differentiation. It should not be the purpose of
exhaustion doctrine to interfere with efficient distribution unless there are
compelling, offsetting reasons. All the more, given that the exhaustion rule is
entirely judge made.
III.Implications and Reach
The per se exhaustion rule declared in Impression Products is a poor fit for
an economy in which restricted distribution has become the norm, at least for
branded, manufactured goods. To be sure, most distribution restraints can be and
are enforced by contract law. As Impression Products itself reveals, however,
some situations are exceptional. To the extent contract enforcement is inadequate
to achieve distribution efficiency, the Impression Products rule may operate so
as to make some types of socially useful distribution unworkable. On the other
side, there are some circumstances in which enforcement actions against those
not in privity of contract are undesirable. This makes exhaustion a good
candidate for something resembling “rule of reason” treatment. The hard part, of
course, is identifying those factors that favor enforcement from those that
disfavor it.
133. Id. at 392.
134. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
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This section briefly examines some areas that might be affected by the
Impression Product decision, and one possible means of evading it, at least for
tying arrangements.
A. Standard-Essential Patents (SEPs)—Reversal of Incentives
Most patentees want their patents to be construed as broadly as possible
consistent with maintaining patent validity, for this will broaden the infringement
net.135 The hard exhaustion doctrine expressed in Impression Products may
change this in certain cases, however. A patentee may have an incentive to argue
that its patent does not read on a particular product that it sells in order to avoid
exhaustion. That effect has already shown up in the ongoing litigation between
Apple and Qualcomm.136
Suppose that a microchip maker sells a chip to a buyer and also owns a
patent that reads on that chip. The chip purchaser then receives an implied license
to practice this patent to the extent it uses the chip for its ordinarily intended
purpose, which almost certainly includes installation in a device together with
other technology. If the patentee attaches a patent notice to the chip tying
complementary products or limiting the components with which the chip can be
used, Impression Products would prevent that restriction from being enforced by
means of a patent infringement suit.137
Suppose, however, that the patent does not read on the chip at all, but that
the chip purchaser later uses the chip in combination with other technology or
processes that might infringe that patent. Exhaustion does not apply, because no
relevant patented article has been sold. Further, the patentee might refuse to
license the patent unless the licensee takes certain tied products or observes an
exclusive dealing restriction. Those provisions would be subject to antitrust
scrutiny, but the challenger would have to show that they are anticompetitive.
Patent infringement would also be possible if the patentee could establish that
the way in which the chip was used infringes its patent, but the sale of the chip
itself would not exhaust it. In sum, the patentee may be considerably better off
if its patent does not read on the chip in question.138
The Supreme Court has addressed such situations, generally ignoring the
exhaustion doctrine because it was undisputed that the patent did not read on the
135. While a broad claim construction casts a wider infringement net, it can also lead
to a finding of invalidity if it brings in obvious subject matter or the broader claim is not adequately
enabled. See, e.g., MagSil Corp. v Hitachi Global Storage Tech., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
136. See Redacted First Amended Complaint, Apple, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 17-
cv-0108-GPC, 2017 WL 5176922 (S.D. Cal. 2017) [hereinafter Qualcomm Complaint]; see also
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01010-GPC, 2017 WL 3966944 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2017)
(order denying Qualcomm’s motion for a preliminary injunction compelling payment of royalties).
137. While Impression Products concerned tying, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), involved restraints on the components with which the patented
product could be used.
138. See Erik Hovenkamp, Tying, Exclusivity, and Standard-Essential Patents, 19
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 79 (2017).
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complementary good. In Leitch, the patentee sold an unpatented asphalt
emulsion for use in building roads, together with a patented process for applying
it. It claimed that the compound was not commercially viable without the
patented process and brought suit against someone who sold the emulsion.
Justice Brandeis’s decision for the Supreme Court refused to enforce the
restriction, concluding that it was an attempt by a patentee of the process to
extend it to cover the unpatentable emulsion.139
Responding to such decisions, Congress added § 271(c) to the 1952 Patent
Act. That provision stated that someone who sells a “material or apparatus for
use in practicing a patented process” can be guilty of contributory infringement
if the seller knew that patent infringement was intended and if the material or
apparatus is “not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use.”140 In Dawson Chemical, the Supreme Court then
held that someone who sold an unpatented herbicide and also owned a patent on
the only known means of application could lawfully bring an action for
contributory infringement against a seller who knew that the purchaser would
apply it by infringing the application patent.141 The Court did not discuss patent
exhaustion because no sale of a patented product was in issue.142
In sum, the sale of a good that embodies a patent exhausts that patent as to
that good. By contrast, if the good itself is not covered by a patent but some
complement to the product is, then patent infringement might apply.143 The
impact complicates a firm’s calculus in deciding whether to declare that a patent
is “standard essential.” Under the operating rules of most standard-setting
organizations, individual participants declare which of their patents are standard-
essential.144 Until litigation arises, that decision is ordinarily subjected to very
little review. That is, for the general run of SEPs no one does a thorough vetting
of the patent in order to determine that it really is essential. Further, no one
typically inquires into validity, and non-litigation related searches are
uncommon.145
139. Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); see also Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (Mercoid I), 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) (referencing some exhaustion decisions,
including Adams and Motion Picture Patents, but only for the proposition that patents must be limited to
the terms of the grant).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012).
141. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980). The contributory
infringement defendant sold the unpatented chemical in a container that bore instructions for its
application, and following the instructions effectively practiced the plaintiff’s method. Id. at 186.
142. By contrast, in Univis the patentee owned patents that covered both the bifocal
lens blanks at issue and the process for grinding them. As a result, exhaustion applied. See United States
v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1942). Because the blanks were covered by patents the sale of
the blanks exhausted those patents. See 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW ¶1782d (4th ed. forthcoming 2018).
143. Assuming, of course, that it is not also exhausted by sale of the complement.
144. See Evaluation of LTE Essential Patents Declared to ETSI, CYBER CREATIVE
INST. 5 (2013), http://www.cybersoken.com/file/lte03EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/3WSZ-QXK2].
145. Id. In fact, one of the issues in the ongoing litigation between Qualcomm and
Apple plus its licensees is whether Qualcomm is simply entitled to a royalty on its portfolio of standard-
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The question whether to declare a patent “standard-essential” involves a
tradeoff. By making the declaration, the patentee is presumptively entitled to
participate in FRAND royalties, but under the FRAND agreement, it must also
agree to license the patent on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and also
to license all takers under the standard, whether or not they are competitors.
Further, FRAND will very likely limit the size of the royalties. If the patentee
withholds a relevant patent from a SEP declaration, however, then it will always
be able to file an infringement action against any infringer and obtain whatever
damages the court orders, but it would have to prove both validity and
infringement, and that the patent was not exhausted by sale of a good.
Notwithstanding these tradeoffs, however, it appears that “over declaring” of
SEPs is relatively common,146 as Apple alleges of Qualcomm.147
It might be possible for a patentee to show both that a particular patent was
standard-essential to a particular technology, but also that this particular patent
did not read on a particular device intended for the standard in question. That is,
the fact that a patent has been declared essential does not necessarily mean that
it is essential for every implementation of a particular standard.148 The two
products might be perfect or at least strong complements. For example, one
needs both a toaster and bread to make toast, but the sale of a loaf of bread would
certainly not exhaust a patent on the heating element of the toaster.
According to allegations by the Federal Trade Commission and Apple,
many of which Qualcomm disputes, Qualcomm is attaching tying and quasi-
exclusive dealing obligations to its technology, most of which is subject to
patents that it has also declared to be standard-essential. To the extent it is
seeking to enforce these restrictions via patent infringement suits against
manufacturers using devices reading on its SEPS, however, exhaustion very
likely prevents it from proceeding. At this writing, the litigation is in the pleading
essential patents, or whether the courts must go through the patents individually in order to determine
validity and infringement. See Qualcomm, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01010-GPC-MDD, 2017 WL
3966944 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2017) (denying preliminary injunction pending resolution of this issue); see
also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1889 (2002). As a general matter, a significant percentage of litigated Standard Essential Patents are
found to be invalid. See RPX Corp., Standard Essential Patents: How do they Fare? (2014), http://
www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Standard-Essential-Patents-How-Do-They-Fare.pdf
[http://perma.cc/B2YT-P73Z] (finding win rates of twenty-to-forty percent but not distinguishing
invalidity from infringement).
146. See Robin Stitzing et al., Over-Declaration of Standard Essential Patents and
Determinants of Essentiality (Working Paper Mar. 31 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2951617 [http://perma.cc/MV5P-U447].
147. Qualcomm Complaint, supra note 136, ¶¶ 33-34 & n.2; see also In re Qualcomm
Antitrust Litig., No. 17-MD-02773, 2017 WL 5235649 (N.D. Ca. Nov. 10, 2017) (sustaining some of
third party licensees claims against Qualcomm and dismissing Sherman Act claim for damages, but not a
California Cartwright Act claim).
148. See id. ¶ 35.
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stage, with one denial of Qualcomm’s request for a preliminary injunction and
one court’s refusal to dismiss some portions of a private lawsuit.149
B. Exhaustion, Tying, and Misuse
Historically, patent exhaustion was liberally applied to patent ties, provided
that the tying product was sold.150 In these cases the infringement plaintiff, as in
Impression Products, sold a patented tying product (whether projector, ice box,
or phonograph) subject to a license condition requiring the purchaser to use the
patentee’s tied product (films, dry ice, or phonograph needles). These cases
simultaneously found both exhaustion and became the historical basis for the
development of the patent “misuse” doctrine.
The patent “misuse” doctrine eventually went further than simple
exhaustion. Under the exhaustion rule, the patentee could not enforce a post-sale
restriction on a patented product once the product had been sold. The unanimous
Supreme Court decision in Suppiger went much further.151 Suppiger owned
patents on a machine that injected salt into canned food as it was being processed.
The company also required lessees of its machines to use its own salt tablets.152
Exhaustion would have prevented it from enforcing that tie by an infringement
action against purchasers, although not lessees, of the machine. The infringement
suit in question was not one against users to enforce the tying condition,
however. Rather, it was a straightforward patent infringement action against a
rival who had made an infringing machine. The infringement defendant
successfully argued that, as long as Suppiger was misusing its own patents by
tying, it could not enforce these patents against anyone—not even against
someone who was not injured by the tie. Indeed, to the extent that Suppiger’s
salt tie was onerous to users of its machine, they would have switched to Morton,
thus making Morton a beneficiary rather than a victim of the tie.
149. Judge Koh has refused to dismiss the FTC’s complaint, which was brought under
Sherman Act standards. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 17-CV-00220, 2017 WL 2774406 (N.D. Cal. June
26, 2017); see also Qualcomm, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01010, 2017 WL 3966944 (S.D. Cal. Sep.
7, 2017) (denying Qualcomm a preliminary injunction compelling royalty payments); Jorge L. Contreras,
Technical Standards, Standard-Setting Organizations and Intellectual Property: A Survey of the
Literature, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S.
Menell & David Schwartz eds., forthcoming 2018) (discussing the relationship between FRAND
standards, downstream licensing, and exhaustion); In re Qualcomm Antitrust Litig., No. 17-MD-02773,
2017 WL 5235649 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2017) (denying action in a challenge to Qualcomm’s alleged tying
of its standard-essential patents to its handsets under the Sherman Act because plaintiffs were indirect
purchasers, but approving it under California’s Cartwright Act, which permits indirect purchaser damages
suits).
150. E.g., Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.,
243 U.S. 490 (1917).
151. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). The Court was
unanimous except for Justice Owen Roberts, who did not participate.
152. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491-92.
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In any event, patent exhaustion did not appear to apply for two reasons.
First, the machines were leased rather than sold. Second, the infringement action
was not one to enforce the tying condition. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held
that the situation was “fundamentally the same” as those cases implicating patent
exhaustion.153 The Seventh Circuit below had approved the infringement suit
after finding that the tie did not violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act because it
did not substantially lessen competition.154 In reversing, the Supreme Court
found it unnecessary to decide the Clayton Act question because both “misuse”
and patent exhaustion applied to defeat the tying restriction.155
Five years after Suppiger, the Supreme Court expanded Clayton Act
antitrust liability to reach a similar tie, effectively eliminating the market power
and effects requirements by holding that market power could be presumed from
the simple fact that the salt-injecting machine was patented.156 This combination
of exhaustion, misuse, and antitrust enabled an aggressive anti-tying regime that
condemned competitively harmless ties for a half century. In 1988, Congress
pushed back with the Patent Misuse Reform Act, and more recently, the Supreme
Court overruled the International Salt presumption of market power from the
existence of a patent.157 Impression Products represents a course reversal, once
again making a certain class of patent ties unenforceable per se.
C. Tying and the Patent Misuse Reform Act
One provision in the Patent Misuse Reform Act, enacted in 1988, was
intended to permit patent owners to enforce patent ties unless they are shown to
be anticompetitive. Relying heavily on that Act, the Supreme Court’s Illinois
Tool Works decision reversed the market power presumption of International
Salt, thus limiting antitrust illegality to situations where market power can be
shown by traditional means.158 So the Act clearly reduced the reach of both
“misuse” doctrine and antitrust to such ties. But what about exhaustion? The
Supreme Court ignored the statute in Impression Products.
The Patent Misuse Reform Act embraces a “conditional” approach to patent
ties, similar to the one that the Impression Products decision rejected.159 Section
(d)(4) of that statute provides that no patent owner shall be denied relief in an
infringement or contributory infringement lawsuit because it
153. Id. at 493 (citing numerous patent and copyright exhaustion cases).
154. G.S. Suppiger Co. v. Morton Salt Co., 117 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1941).
155. Morton, 314 U.S. at 494.
156. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
157. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
158. On the impact of Illinois Tool Works, see 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 518 (4th ed. 2014).
159. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2018).
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[c]onditioned . . . the sale of the patented product on the . . . purchase of a separate
product . . . unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market
power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the
license or sale is conditioned.160
Section (d)(4) applies only to tying arrangements, but it unambiguously
provides that a person who conditions the “sale” of a patented product on the
buyer’s purchase of a second product may enforce that requirement by means of
a patent infringement action, at least so long as the patent holder has not been
shown to have market power in the primary product.161
The Impression Products Court did not consider whether § 271(d)(4)
operated as an exception to patent exhaustion for tying arrangements, however,
very likely because the language of the statute does not fit very well with what
Lexmark did in that case. It did not require purchasers of its patented printers to
purchase its patented cartridges. Rather, it required a certain class of customers
to return their empty cartridges to Lexmark and forbade others from refilling
them. The result of this policy, if completely effective, would have been to steer
Lexmark printer users to Lexmark cartridges, but to the extent the statutory
language contemplates an express tying condition, the Lexmark condition did
not reveal it.
Nevertheless, Lexmark might have avoided the Impression Products result
simply by writing a somewhat different condition, designed to fall within §
271(d)(4). If it had fixed a notice to each printer and each cartridge to the effect
that use of anything other than original equipment Lexmark cartridges in the
printer constituted patent infringement, that provision would have fallen within
§ 271(d)(4), rendering it immune from exhaustion challenge. Under a different
provision of § 271, a refiller would be guilty of contributory infringement,
provided that the refilled cartridge was not capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.162 As noted previously, Lexmark’s small market share would make a
finding of sufficient market power unlikely.163
160. Id.
161. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 535 (2011) (making this observation).
162. That act would be covered by 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2018):
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
See also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1980) (finding infringement
when patentee’s component was not capable of substantial noninfringing uses); Lucent Tech., Inc. v.
Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding contributory infringement when
defendant’s complementary product did not have substantial noninfringing uses); I4I Ltd. P’ship v.
Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 851 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding similar), aff’d on other grounds, 564 U.S.
91 (2011).
163. See supra note 21 and accompanying discussion.
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IV. Assessing Unreasonable Patent Exhaustion
An important difference between patent exhaustion and antitrust rules on
restricted distribution is the method of enforcement. While federal antitrust law
applies to both contract enforcement and enforcement via infringement actions,
the exhaustion rule applies only to the latter. There may be good reasons for
adopting narrower rules for infringement actions, which can reach people not in
privity of contract. Nevertheless, that does not justify a per se prohibition such
as the one the Court adopted in Impression Products. In some circumstances,
enforcement via infringement suits may be a more efficient way of organizing
distribution than enforcement by breach of contract actions. Fashioning an
appropriate rule requires appreciation of just how many such situations there are,
as well as the social cost of a rule that is too harsh or too lenient.
Further, patent law may have concerns that reach beyond antitrust law. As
a result, the Mallinkrodt rule permitting infringement actions upon a clearly
stated condition unless the condition constitutes an antitrust violation or patent
misuse seems excessively tolerant.164 For example, infringement suits can catch
the unaware by surprise. This can be remedied by a judicial amendment requiring
effective and timely notice.165 Overbroad enforcement rights may lead to
splintering of royalty obligations, producing high transaction costs and double
marginalization.166 Effects may differ depending on the type of remedy that the
patentee is able to obtain, whether damages or an injunction. Some conditions
apply only once, typically to end users, while others get passed down the
distribution chain. As a general proposition, none of these effects violates the
antitrust laws, even though they might reduce economic welfare.
Even the duration issue is less categorical and more complex than it first
appears. As noted previously, the common law was generally more willing to
enforce restraints that were limited in time. One must always ask, however, time
in relation to what? A 100-year restraint such as the rule against perpetuities
might permit seems relatively short in relation to family interests in land. By
contrast, a use restraint on a reusable printer cartridge that lasts for the remaining
life of its patents—say, ten years—may be as good as forever. The question is
the relationship between the duration of the restraint and the relevant life of the
product to which it applies. Some post-sale restraints, such as the restrictions on
re-use or refilling in Mallinkrodt and Impression Products operate effectively for
the life of the product to which they are attached. They operate by shortening the
usable life of the product.
164. See Mallinkrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(permitting a clearly stated condition that accompanies a sale to be enforced via an infringement action
unless the condition violates the antitrust laws or constitutes patent misuse); see also Wentong Zheng,
Exhausting Patents, 63 UCLA L. REV. 122 (2016) (offering a similar proposal).
165. See Hovenkamp, supra note 161, at 516-522
166. Id. at 513-15.
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The best way to address these problems is not through antitrust law, but
rather by development of a federal common law of post-sale patent restraints that
is more nuanced than is reflected in existing Supreme Court doctrine, but that
reaches further than antitrust. The fact that the restraints come in a large variety
suggests that a common law judge made approach would be better than a statute.
The suggestions offered here are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather
illustrative of the fact that post-sale restraints come in many different kinds, with
differing effects on welfare, competition, or innovation. To the extent
manageable, an effective set of enforcement rules for such restraints must take
these differences into account. In the process, it would make patent law more
sensitive to the variety of market situations in which patents are licensed.
One important consideration in the development of such doctrine is the
effect of the distribution restraint when enforcement is limited to breach of
contract suits. When simple contract enforcement is likely to satisfy the
patentee’s legitimate distribution needs, the case for enforcement via
infringement actions is much less important. Accordingly, a court can feel free
to apply exhaustion. This query would result in exhaustion in many but not all
situations. In Impression Products itself for example, the Court acknowledged
that contract enforcement mechanisms were inadequate.167 In that case,
application of exhaustion was ill advised without a showing that some other harm
to competition or innovation was in prospect.
Contractual enforcement of resale price maintenance rules, another
frequent subject of exhaustion litigation, is usually accomplished quite easily, at
least in two-stage distribution systems. Cheating sales are ordinarily detectable.
Prices must be advertised in order to be effective, and rival dealers can be trusted
to complain.168 In sum, violations of resale price maintenance provisions are
generally easier to detect than violations of tying arrangements imposed on
consumers. As a result, the effectiveness of contract law suggests that the courts
can feel freer to apply exhaustion.
Restrictions on the resale of exported and re-imported goods, relevant in
both Kirtsaeng and Impression Products, raise different issues. Sellers often
engage in third-degree price discrimination169 as between domestic and foreign
sales—a strategy that can be frustrated by arbitrage. For example, Kirtsaeng
might purchase books at a low price in Asia in order to import and resell them in
the United States at a higher price. Third-degree price discrimination can
increase welfare if it increases output,170 and in many such cases, the foreign
sales are an output increasing strategy. That is, consumer elasticity of demand is
167. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark, Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1530 (2017).
168. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1453 (4th
ed. 2017).
169. In third-degree price discrimination, a seller pre-selects different groups of
customers based on its assessment of differential willingness-to-pay and prices accordingly.
170. See, e.g., Simon Cowan, Welfare-Increasing Third-Degree Price Discrimination,
47 RAND J. ECON. 326 (2016).
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higher in the foreign country, and the seller can make those sales only at a lower
price. In a well-functioning price discrimination program, it need not lose higher
price domestic sales in order to make the foreign sales. That policy will be
defeated, however, if a foreign purchaser such as Kirtsaeng can arbitrage the
books back into the domestic market. In that case, an exhaustion rule might make
the publisher decide not to sell books in another country at a lower price at all.
The best economic policy is to permit the IP rights holder to discriminate. An
immediate purchaser from the publisher would have privity of contract, so an
infringement suit would be unnecessary.171 Detection might be an issue, but not
one that would distinguish infringement actions from contract actions. A
purchaser two or three steps removed would not have privity, however. Of
course, a notice restricting resale territories could readily be placed inside the
book, effectively communicating it to more remote resellers.172
An important requirement of any federal common law of post-sale patent
restraints should be effective and timely notice to prospective infringers.
Although patent infringement does not require that the infringer have prior notice
of infringement or even of the patent’s existence, that is hardly the same thing as
notice of a particular restriction that has been imposed in a patent license. To the
extent a post-sale restraint is likely to catch infringement defendants who are
unaware, enforcement should be denied. By contrast, if notice is given and
effective to all downstream parties, including those not in privity with the rights
holder, then enforcement is more appropriate.
Federalism concerns may also be appropriate when a post-sale restraint
creates inconsistency with state law. Under the Supremacy Clause, the
requirements for federal patent infringement trump inconsistent state law, but a
judge-made common law of post-sale restraints could apply comity so as to give
state law due regard. For example, the manufacturer of a patented outdoor grill
might impose a condition charging purchasers a higher price if they do not use
its own refillable propane tanks. But those tanks may be banned by state law as
dangerous. A federal court might well apply common law powers to hold that
such an enforcement action pushes the federal law of patent infringement too far
into territory that should be reserved to the states.
Lest this strike some as inconsistent with the supremacy of federal law, it
is worth noting that federal antitrust policy makes these tradeoffs all the time.
171. In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 526-527 (2013), Kirtsaeng
asked friends and relatives in Thailand to purchase books oversees at the lower price and mail them to
him while he studied in the United States. He then resold the books on eBay or other websites. In that case
the publisher and Kirtsaeng were not in privity.
172. Cf. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). The restriction was printed
in each copy of the book just behind the title page: “The price of this book at retail is $1 net. No dealer is
licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright.
The Bobbs-Merrill Company.” Id. at 341. Such a notice, unless removed, would be warning to anyone
downstream, no matter how removed from the publisher. The foreign-distributed Wiley books in
Kirtsaeng also contained a printed notice in each foreign-sold book restricting the location of sale. See
568 U.S. at 525-26.
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 35, 2018
548
For those activities in or affecting interstate commerce, the Sherman Act could
trump thousands of state measures that regulate rates or exclude certain firms
from markets. But antitrust policy does not follow a course of knocking all state
economic regulation to the side simply because Congress has the power to do so.
Instead, it looks for ways to make federal antitrust policy work in tandem with
state regulation. That entails that sometimes federal supremacy reigns, but in
other cases, state or local regulation prevails.173 Further, the set of rules that
makes these determinations—principally the “state action” doctrine174—are
essentially judge made and highly fact specific.
Conclusion
The Impression Products patent exhaustion rule is a blunt instrument in
relation to the justifications offered for it. In its favor, a rule of per-se-exhaustion-
upon-sale is simply stated and perhaps easily understood.175 Because it is so
categorical, however, it fails to distinguish harmful uses of post-sale restraints
from the large number that are beneficial. The antitrust law of restricted
distribution began in a similar place, adopting categorical per se rules that, as our
understanding of the economics of restricted distribution changed, eventually
gave way to more nuanced treatment under the rule of reason. Even a quick
examination of the types of restraints imposed in exhaustion cases indicates that
they are used for many different purposes and with different effects. The
Impression Products decision was wrong to make these differences irrelevant.
173. For a survey of such situations, see 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 2B (4th ed. 2013) (federal antitrust law); id. ch. 24 (3d ed. 2012)
(state antitrust law); see also Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2340 (2013) (“[T]he backers of the Sherman Act assured the floor of the Senate
that they were merely seeking to enable federal courts to apply the common law to anticompetitive
business activities and early federal cases are full of citations to English and state common law.”).
174. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 173, at chs. 1A, 2B-3.
175. But see Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 498 (1917), in which
the patentee attempted to evade the first sale doctrine by nominally “licensing” phonograph machines to
dealers, who were authorized to relicense them to consumers even though the transactions bore all the
indicia of a sale, including assignment of all risk of loss or nonsale to the acquiring dealers. Further, the
“royalty” stipulated in the agreement was an upfront lump sum of $200, suggesting that it was a disguised
sale. The Court concluded that:
Courts would be perversely blind if they failed to look through such an attempt as this “License
Notice” thus plainly is to sell property for a full price, and yet to place restraints upon its further
alienation, such as have been hateful to the law from Lord Coke’s day to ours, because
obnoxious to the public interest.
Id. at 500-01. The case involved both resale price maintenance and tying. On the latter, users were required
to use only needles and phonograph records supplied by Victor. This suggests that Victor very likely had
an enforcement problem similar to the one that the Court recognized in Impression Products. See supra
notes 23-24 and accompanying discussion.
